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vessel was not sufficient to satisfy all of the recorded liens. But if the result were
accomplished, would not the state court be providing an zn rem remedy by another
name, and hence, m fact be encroaching on the federal admiralty jurisdiction by
"tenuous formalities"?
The second criticism is that the decision seems to violate the spirit of the
original grant of admiralty jurisdiction; both by refusing to lay down a national
partition rule, and by allowing the states concurrent jurisdiction. Diversity of
decision is almost certain to appear, the very danger the grant was to avoid. As
Mr. Justice Frankfurter says:
"It is significant that the need for a body of maritime law, applicable throughout the
nation and not left to the diversity of the several States, was the one basis for the
creation of a system of infenor federal courts, authorized by the Constitution, which
was recognized by every shade of opinion at the Philadelphia Convention." 22
Much earlier the same thought was voiced:
"It certainly could not have been the intention to place the rules and limits of man-
time law under the disposal and regulation of the several states, as that would have
defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all sub-
jects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the states with each other
or with foreign states. ' 23
This premise has often been reiterated in the Supreme Court decisions.24 The
Madruga case does not contradict the premise, but it does threaten it. The extent
of harmful diversity lies in the future, as does a corrective decision, if one is needed,
by the' Supreme Court.
Herberh G. Hawkzns
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE: A CHEmicAL TEST FOR INTOXICATION-
AccuRAcy AND GENERAL SCIENTIFIC ACCEPTANCE.
In a recent New York case1 it was held, in upholding a conviction for driving
while under the influence of alcohol, that the Drunkometer was a scientifically re-
liable and accurate device for determining the alcoholic content of the defendant's
blood. The defendant was arrested by police officers of New York City They car-
ried him to the precinct station where he was given the chemical test by a graduate
chemist employed by the police department.
The Drunkometer is a mechanical device whereby blood alcohol content is
determined through the analysis of breath blown into a rubber balloon which has
a tube leading to chemicals and a meter. The result showed the defendant to have
a blood alcohol reading of 0.19 per cent, which, the New York Vehicle and Traffic
Law2 makes prima facie evidence of intoxication. The defendant objected to the
22 See note 10 suPra.23 The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 654 (1875).24 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) ; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,
253 U.S. 149 (1920) ; Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S., 247 U.S. 377 (1918).
1People v. Kovacik, 205 Misc. 275, 128 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1954).
2 Naw YoRx VmincLE m TRAmrc LAW, § 70, Sub. 5. This section provides that a blood
alcohol content of 0.05 or lower is prima fade evidence of sobriety, that a blood alcohol con-
tent of over 0.05 and less than 0.15 is relevant evidence only, that a blood alcohol content of
0.15 or more is prima fade evidence of intoxication.
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introduction of the results by the prosecution through the testimony of the chemist
who administered the test. The defendant also objected to testimony by Dr. R. N.
Harger, inventor of the Drunkometer, who, as an expert witness, testified to the
accuracy of the device. The objection was overruled by the trial judge. The de-
fendant offered no expert witnesses in his own behalf. On appeal, the court based
its opinion on the fact that the Drunkometer had been accepted in the courts of
other states,3 and quoted from Toms v. State,4 an Oklahoma case which upheld
the admission of the drunkometer test as evidence.
"This court is of the opinion, that we should favor the adoption of scientific methods
for crime detection, where the demonstrated accuracy and reliability has become estab-
lished and recognized. Justice is truth in action, and any instrumentality, which aids
in ascertainment of truth, should be embraced without delay. But this decision is not
ours to make. We have no legislative powers or duties, but the legislature within its
legislative powers and constitutional limitations may do so, possibly on the theory that
it is within its police powers to regulate the highways for the protection of the public.
We believe, in the light of the foregoing, chemical tests by experts of body fluids as
blood, urine, breath, spinal fluid, saliva, etc., under varying conditions have been ap-
proved as having gained that scientific recognition of infallibility as to be admissible
in evidence."
In the Toms case, the expert witness for the prosecution was a physician, who
was considered an expert on the subject of intoxication simply by reason of being
a physician. 5 He testified that the instrument was accurate, and that it was in-
dorsed by the American Medical Association, the Commissioner of National Safety,
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The court ruled that the physician's tes-
timony was sufficient to support the admission of the drunkometer evidence. The
objection, the court ffirther stated, that there is scientific disagreement as to its
accuracy goes only to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility
Proper instructions to the jury are that such evidence is not conclusive, but that
it shall only be accorded such weight as the jury sees fit. 6
On the other hand, Michigan7 has refused to allow Drunkometer results in
evidence. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed a conviction of negligent hormi
cide, stating that there is "no testimony in the record" establishing that the medical
profession generally accepts the Drunkometer as accurate. That court used the rule
as applied to the lie detector. The reasons for the inadmissibility of lie detector
evidence are two-fold: (1) The lie detector has not that general recognition of
scientific accuracy by experts in the field to warrant judicial acceptance of its
results.8 (2) By reason of this disagreement between the men learned in the field,
a trial of the lie detector and its underlying theories would result, rather than a
trial of the real issues before the court.9
a State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953), State v. Warren, 75 Ariz. 123, 252 P.2d
781 (1953), People v. Bobczyk, 343 Ill.App. 504, 99 N.E.2d 567 (1951), Willennar v. State,
228 Ind. 248, 91 N.E.2d 178 (1950), People on the Complaint of Mehan v. Spears, 201 Misc.
666, 114 N.Y.S. 869 (1952), Toms v. State, ........ Okla. Cr. R ......... , 239 P.2d 812 (1952),
Lombness v. State . ....... Okl. Cr. R ......... , 243 P.2d 389 (1952), McKay v State, 155 Tex. Cr.
416, 235 S.W.2d 173 (1951), Guenther v. State, 153 Tex. Cr. 519, 221 S.W.2d 780 (1949),
Omohundro v. County of Arlington, 194 Va. 773, 75 S.E.2d 496 (1953).
4 See note 3 supra.
53 WxomOin, EVIDENCE, § 687, 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 866.
6 Toms v. State, supra note 3.
7 People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N.W.2d 322 (1949).
8 Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 293 Fed. 1013 (1923), People v. Forte, 279 N.Y.
204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938), State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W 314 (1933).
9 State v. Bohner, supra note 8.
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Testifying for the prosecution in the Michigan case were two policemen trained
in chemistry and a physician. They gave complex explanations of the underlying
theory in conjunction with the method of operation of the drunkometer. It was
also testified to by the witnesses, that in their opinion, the drunkometer gave accu-
rate results. There is no mention in the opnion as given by the Michigan Supreme
Court that any of the prosecution witnesses expressed any views in regard to the
general scientific recognition of the Drunkometer. On the other hand, five doctors
for the defense testified that the Drunkometer is maccurate. One of the doctors
also stated that most of the medical profession do not accept the instrument as
accurate, which was supported by an article appearing in a medical journal.'0
Therefore, it would seem that the Michigan case is distinguishable on the grounds
that there was an insufficient foundation laid by the prosecution for the introduc-
tion of experimental evidence."
It is a general rule that the admssibility in evidence of the results of experi-
ments or tests is a matter peculiarly within the discretion of the trial judge.12
Normally the trial judge's ruling will not be disturbel unless it is apparent that
this discretion has been abused.y In People v. Morse, the Michigan case dis-
cussed above, it would seem that the trial judge had "abused" this discretion,
because there was no basis upon which the experimental evidence was admissible.
The appellate court held this to be reversible error. Similarly, the evidence was
not admissible on the ground that the trial court could take judicial notice of the
results of the Drunkometer as being generally accepted in the medical profession. 4
IllinoisP5 is another jurisdiction where the results of the Drunkometer have
been admissible. The Appellate Court of Illinois held that an objection of lack
of unanimity in the medical profession as to the test's accuracy went to the weight
of the evidence, where the state properly introduced the experts and establisheO
they were eminently qualified in the field. The court reasoned that:
"Medical science recognizes sixty pathological conditions which produce symptoms
similar to those produced by alcohol, yet the law permits non-expert lay witnesses to
testify to objective symptoms commonly associated with alcoholic intoxication on the
theory that sobriety or intoxication are matters of common knowledge."iO
The view that scientific disagreement should not prevent the admissibility of
experimental evidence is upheld in McKay v. State17 where the court, speaking
regarding the Drunkometer said:
"This court may recognize generally accepted scientific conclusions, even though there
should be some who disagree with them. In all probability a scientist may be found
who will disagree with practically every generally accepted scientific theory. We takejudicial knowledge of the scientific fact that the earth is-round. At the same time we
know there are still individuals who claim to be scientists who have other theories,
even to the extent of holding that instead of living on the outer surface of the globe,
we live within a globe, and that there are within it sun, moon, stars, and all heavenly
1O Haggard et al, The Alcohol of the Lung Air as an Index of Alcohol in the Blood, 26 J.
op LAB. AND CI .MED. 1527.
11 Frye v. United States, supra note 8; 20 Am. JuR., Evidence, § 755.
12 Wynes v. State, 182 Ga. 434, 185 S.E. 711 (1936) ; Spires v. State, 70 Fla. 121, 39 So. 181
(1905) ; 9 WiGooRE, EVmENCE, § 2550; 20 Am. JuR., Evidence, § 755.
13 See note 12 supra.
1422 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 538; 20 Am. JuR., Evidence, § 98.
15 People v. Bobcyzk, supra note 3.16 People v. Bobcyzk, supra note 3.
17 McKay v. State, supra note 3.
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bodies which we observe. We would have no trouble in disagreeing with such theory,
but it does not destroy the fact that there are others who have a different view. The
opinion of such others by no means bars the evidence of a scientific truth before a jury,
nor would it preclude the courts from taking judicial knowledge of the truth of it."I s
Other cases have not allowed convictions obtained with the help of Drunkome-
ter evidence. But none of the reversals resulted from the existence of scientific
debate as to the accuracy of the machine. In State v. Hunter, 9 a new trial was
granted because it was discovered after conviction that a torsion balance scale
was used instead of the more sensitive analytical balance scale. Hill v. State20
was reversed because of the lack of a qualified expert witness to substantiate the
introduction of the test evidence. The witness who testified did not have a suf-
ficient technical background to understand the theory of the machine. As a result,
he could not translate the instrument readings into per cent of blood alcohol.
Instead, he had to translate by way of a chart which came with the Drunkometer.
The court held this to be hearsay, and concluded that a proper toundation for the
admission of such evidence was lacking. By way of dicta, the court held there
were three requisites for the admissibility of the results of the Drunkometer into
evidence: (1) proof that the chemicals used were compounded to the proper per-
centage; (2) proof that the operator and the machine were under the periodic
supervision of one who has an understanding of the scientific theory; (3) proof
by a witness who was qualified to calculate and translate the reading of the instru-
ment scale into percentage of alcohol in the blood.
It was wisely observed in Frye v. United States21 that:
"Just when a scientific principle of discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in the twilight zone the evi-
dential force of the principle must be recogmzed, and while courts will go a long way
It was wisely observed in Frye v. United States2' that:
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle of
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."
Since 1952, the Drunkometer has been approved by the American Medical
Association, the Commissioner of National Safety, the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, and twelve states by statute.22 It is submitted, then, that the Drunkometer
has crossed "the line between the experimental and demonstrable" stage as pro-
pounded in Frye v. Unted States, supra. Therefore, objections by the defendant
to the admissibility of the Drunkometer in evidence because of a lack of general
scientific acceptance should not be sustained. But the defendant could object to
the admissibility where that particular Drunkometer in issue at trial was inaccu-
rate from some malfunction, or where there was a lack of qualified personnel ad-
ministering the test, or where there was no proper foundation laid for the testi-
mony of the expert witness interpreting and translating the results of the test.
Thus People v. Kovacik,3 was correctly decided by the court. It upheld the
admissibility of the results of the Drunkometer under the New York Vehicle and
18 McKay v. State, supra note 3.
19 4 N.J. Super. 531, 68 A.2d 274 (1949).
20 ........ Tex. Cr ......... 256 S.W.2d 93 (1953).
21 See note 8 supra.
22 Toms v. State, supra note 3.
23 See note 1 supra.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6
